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What’s an Intimate Relationship, Anyway?
Expanding Access to the New York State
Family Courts for Civil Orders
of Protection
Jennifer Cranstoun, Christopher O’Connor, &
Tracey Alter*
I. A Long and Winding Road Reaches the End—and
a New Beginning
When New York Governor David A. Paterson signed a new
law into effect on July 21, 2008 that substantially expanded ac-
cess for domestic violence victims seeking orders of protection in
family court,1 his signature ended what had been an intense
twenty-year lobbying effort.2  Up until then, New York State’s
remarkably narrow family court access scheme had only in-
cluded domestic violence victims legally related by blood, mar-
riage, or having children in common,3 and bills to expand
access, which were previously proposed and circulated in the
* Jennifer Cranstoun, Esq. of the Pace Women’s Justice Center is the Senior
Supervising Attorney at the Family Court Legal Program and a 1999 graduate of
Pace University School of Law.  Christopher O’Connor is a second-year law stu-
dent at Pace University School of Law and was a Fall 2008 Extern in the Pace
Family Court Legal Program.  Tracey Alter, Esq. of the Pace Women’s Justice
Center is the Director of the Pace Family Court Legal Program and a 1991 gradu-
ate of Fordham University School of Law.  The Pace Women’s Justice Center, dedi-
cated to providing legal services to victims of domestic violence, is a nonprofit
organization affiliated with Pace University School of Law.
1. See Expanded Access to Family Court Act, ch. 326, 2008 N.Y. Laws 326
(codified as amended in scattered sections of N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW, and N.Y. JUD. LAW). See also New York State Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, Policy Updates, http://www.nyscadv.org/policyupdate08.htm (last visited
Apr. 7, 2009) (referencing the new legislation as the “Expanded Access to Family
Court” Act.).
2. See Joel Stashenko, Bill Passes to Expand Reach of Family Court’s Protec-
tion Orders, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 2008, at 1, col. 3.
3. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)-(d) (McKinney 1998) (current version at
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)-(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009)); HELENE WEINSTEIN,
N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, Assemb. 11707,
231st Sess. (2008); GEORGE H. WINNER, N.Y. STATE S., INTRODUCER’S MEMORAN-
DUM IN SUPPORT, S. 8665, 231st Sess. (2008).
455
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state legislature by victims’ rights activists and advocates for
women’s rights, consistently fell short.4  Formerly, the law de-
terred victims of domestic violence in dating and same-sex rela-
tionships, as well as others considered “unrelated” under New
York State law, from seeking orders of protection against their
abusers because the only recourse available to these groups was
to pursue prosecution in criminal court.5
The New York State Legislature has been regarded as a no-
toriously slow-moving body in adapting with the times,6 but
here it proved particularly glacial.  Often, those in opposition to
expanding access to the family court cited concerns over how a
problematically broad access scheme could raise issues of judi-
cial economy.7  Advocates for the new law and other analysts
also believe that lingering political concern over what might be
4. See Stashenko, supra note 2.  New York State Assemblywoman Helene
Weinstein, the chairperson of the New York State Assembly’s Judiciary Commit-
tee, was a regular co-sponsor of all similar past legislation and co-sponsored this
successful effort with New York State Senator George H. Winner. See id. See also
Assemb. 11707, 231st Sess. (N.Y. 2008); S. 8665, 231st Sess., 2008 N.Y. Laws 326.
5. See Stashenko, supra note 2. See also HELENE WEINSTEIN, N.Y. STATE AS-
SEMB., MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, Assemb. 11707, 231st Sess.
(2008); GEORGE H. WINNER, N.Y. STATE S., INTRODUCER’S MEMORANDUM IN SUP-
PORT, S. 8665, 231st Sess. (2008).  By making Family Court accessible to these
individuals, the victim’s safety is promoted by the expedited manner in which a
family court order of protection can be obtained, by the focus on prevention of fu-
ture abuse, and by the potential two- to five-year duration of orders of protection.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney Supp. 2009).  Additionally, victims seeking
protection in family court maintain a significant degree of control in the process by
being able to choose a safe time to obtain the temporary order, help determine the
relief sought, and ultimately decide whether to continue with the process. N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 812 (McKinney Supp. 2009).
6. See JEREMY M. CREELAN & LAURA M. MOULTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUS-
TICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE  NEW  YORK  STATE LEGISLATIVE  PROCESS: AN
EVALUATION AND BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 1 (2004), available at https://www.policy
archive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/8774/34The%20New%20York%20State%20
Legislative%20Process-%20An%20Evaluation%20and%20Blueprint%20for%20Re-
form.pdf?sequence=1 (“It has become something of a cliche´ to bemoan Albany’s
dysfunctional legislative process and the ‘three men in a room’ system of lawmak-
ing.  Virtually every major newspaper in New York State has editorialized for
many years against the current system and its byproducts, including perennially
late budgets, the lack of open deliberation and debate, empty seat voting, gridlock,
costliness and inappropriate payments, incumbency protection, or the extent of
control exercised by the two leaders.”).
7. N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, OVERSIGHT: OBTAINING ORDERS OF PROTECTION FOR VIC-
TIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS (2004), available at http://
webdocs.nyccouncil.info/attachments/63305.htm?CFID=2696206&CFTOKEN=
34714253.
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/4
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perceived as an implicit legislative endorsement of same-sex
marriage historically impeded the bill’s passage.8
The question that arises then is what changed in 2008 to
finally drive the bill to passage?  Governor Paterson, a former
state senator and lieutenant governor, has long been a staunch
supporter of efforts to combat domestic violence.9  Moreover,
Governor Paterson had the political expertise needed to per-
suade the conservative leadership of the State Senate to en-
dorse the bill’s passage.10  In fact, Governor Paterson told the
New York Times just prior to the bill’s passage that he “person-
ally took up the issue” with now-retired Senate Majority Leader
Joseph Bruno, a long-time power player in Albany.11
Additionally, the coalition of activists and advocates that
pushed for the change was larger and more organized than
ever.  In a letter prepared and sent to domestic violence advo-
cates, activists, survivors, and community members throughout
New York State in January 2008, the New York Statewide Coa-
lition for Fair Access to Family Court emphasized the impor-
tance of seeking the change:
These victims [ineligible for family court access] often
go without protection because, currently, the only
other option is to involve law enforcement and hope
that the abuser will be prosecuted and an order of pro-
tection granted by the Criminal Court.  This is not an
option for many victims, especially given the very real
risk of increased violence from their abuser [sic] if law
enforcement becomes involved.12
8. See, e.g., Sarah E. Warne, Note, Rocks, Hard Places and Unconventional
Domestic Violence Victims: Expanding Availability of Civil Orders of Protection in
New York, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 279, 300 (2008).
9. Press Release, State of N.Y., New York State Enhances Domestic Violence
Prevention Efforts (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/
1025072_print.html; New York State, Learn More About Lt. Governor Paterson,
http://www.ny.gov/ltgov/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
10. Danny Hakim, Albany to Expand Domestic Violence Law to Include Dat-
ing Relationships, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at B3, available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2008/07/10/nyregion/10domestic.html.
11. Id.
12. Letter from the N.Y. Statewide Coal. for Fair Access to Family Court (Jan.
2008), available at http://fairaccessnewyork.com/.  Members of the coalition’s steer-
ing committee include Day One, the Empire Justice Center, the Joint Public Af-
fairs Committee for Older Adults, the New York State Coalition Against Domestic
3
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Stephanie Nilva, executive director of the New York City
non-profit agency Day One, stated that the force in numbers of
assembling such a large network had a tangible effect.13  Ms.
Nilva relayed that another coalition member recalled being con-
tacted by an editorial writer for the New York Times in early
June 2008.14  The paper was preparing an editorial pressing the
state legislature to pass several proposed and, in the paper’s
opinion, much-needed pieces of legislation.15  One of these legis-
lative proposals was an effort to hire thirty-nine new family
court judges to alleviate the excessive caseload burden.16  While
offering input on that issue, the coalition member also urged
the writer to discuss the coalition’s cause in the article.17  On
June 2, 2008, that New York Times editorial included the fol-
lowing couplet: “The Legislature should also fix a serious gap in
the law: the inability of people in serious relationships with no
children in common to obtain orders of protection in Family
Court.  Most states allow such orders, which are critical for pub-
lic safety.”18  In reaction to this key and timely media exposure,
Ms. Nilva reflected that it “was a moment where we recognized
the importance of having so many people involved in our
effort.”19
This article is intended as a starting point and will, it is
hoped, serve as a useful guide for New York practitioners by
analyzing how the new access scheme for obtaining family court
orders of protection will operate.  First, the article will examine
the relevant statute’s language and the issues that it presents.
Second, it will attempt to predict what structural and political
conundrums lie ahead as the state adapts to any changes and
awaits the interpretive guidance of family court judges.  Lastly,
the article will analyze how other states have set their own
Violence, Sanctuary for Families, the New York City Gay & Lesbian Anti-Violence
Project, and the Urban Justice Center. Id.
13. Telephone Interview with Stephanie Nilva, Esq., Executive Dir., Day One
(Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Nilva, Telephone Interview].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Editorial, Repairing New York’s Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2008,
at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/02/opinion/02mon2.html
[hereinafter Repairing New York’s Justice System].
17. Id.
18. Repairing New York’s Justice System, supra note 16.
19. Nilva, Telephone Interview, supra note 13.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/4
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boundaries for issuing family court orders of protection and will
analyze case law from Texas, Massachusetts, and Penn-
sylvania, states whose access schemes closely resemble those of
New York.
II. The Statutory Change Itself
The Expanded Access to Family Court Act effects a signifi-
cant change to New York State’s definition of “members of the
same family or household” for purposes of establishing jurisdic-
tion for orders of protection in family court.20  Previously, sec-
tion 812 of the Family Court Act read:
For purposes of this article, “members of the same
family or household” shall mean the following: (a) per-
sons related by consanguinity or affinity; (b) persons
legally married to one another; (c) persons formerly
married to one another; and (d) persons who have a
child in common regardless whether such persons
have been married or have lived together at any
time.21
Among the fifty states, New York’s statutory definition
stood as one of the narrowest in the country and was the only
one that did not permit persons unrelated by law to earn an
20. Ch. 326, sec. 7, § 812(1), 2008 N.Y. Laws 326 (codified as amended at N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1) (McKinney Supp. 2009); ch. 326, sec. 11, § 503.11, 2008 N.Y.
Laws 326 (codified as amended at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1) (McKinney
Supp. 2009)).  The enumerated family offenses over which family court and crimi-
nal court are afforded concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 812(1) and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1) (McKinney Supp. 2009) are
disorderly conduct, harassment in the first degree, harassment in the sec-
ond degree, aggravated harassment in the second degree, stalking in the
first degree, stalking in the second degree, stalking in the third degree,
stalking in the fourth degree, criminal mischief, menacing in the second de-
gree, menacing in the third degree, reckless endangerment, assault in the
second degree, assault in the third degree [and] attempted assault . . . .
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1).
21. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)-(d) (McKinney 1998) (current version at
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)-(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009)).  Consanguinity is de-
fined as “[t]he relationship of persons of the same blood or origin.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 133 (3d pocket ed. 2006).  Affinity is defined as “[t]he relation that one
spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse; relationship by marriage.”
Id. at 26.
5
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order of protection from family or other civil courts.22  Conse-
quently, interpretation of the old definition created a restrictive
access scheme.  This meant that if an unmarried woman was
pregnant with her abusive male partner’s child, or a teenager
was being mistreated by her boyfriend, or one partner in a
same-sex relationship was being battered by the other, or a
step-parent or step-child lost affinity with the abusive party ei-
ther through death or divorce, then no legal recourse likely ex-
isted for these victims of domestic violence to receive orders of
protection from the family court.23
One recent case, decided just weeks before Governor Pater-
son signed the final version of the new law, demonstrates just
how constricted efforts to seek remedies in family court can be.
In In re Miriam M. v. Warren M.,24 the petitioner successfully
sought a two-year order of protection against the respondent,
her brother, following a dispute in which he verbally threatened
her, made “violent motions with his hands in close proximity” to
her, and struck her domestic partner (referred to in the decision
as “Ms. Diaz”).25  The court held that the brother’s conduct con-
stituted disorderly conduct and harassment in the second de-
gree.26  The family court order barred respondent from
contacting Ms. Diaz and from visiting her at her job.27
The First Department of the Appellate Division, however,
found two errors in the lower court’s decision to grant this or-
der.  First, the Appellate Division held that the family court or-
der could legally bar the respondent from contacting Ms. Diaz
or from visiting her at her job because “it would go toward
achieving the purpose of fully protecting petitioner.”28  Second,
22. HELENE WEINSTEIN, N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
LEGISLATION, Assemb. 11707, 231st Sess. (2008); GEORGE H. WINNER, N.Y. STATE
S., INTRODUCER’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT, S. 8665, 231st Sess. (2008). See also
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)-(d) (McKinney 1998) (current version at N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)-(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009)).
23. See, e.g., Dulanto v. Dulanto, 714 N.Y.S.2d 748 (App. Div. 2000) (denying
family court jurisdiction to a stepmother seeking an order of protection against her
stepdaughter because her divorce from stepdaughter’s father “dissolved” and “ter-
minated” any affinity, or legally recognized relationship, the two enjoyed).
24. 859 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. Div. 2008).
25. Id. at 67.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 68.
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/4
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and paradoxically, the court could neither uphold the respon-
dent’s assault of Ms. Diaz as an “aggravating circumstance,”
nor could the order prohibit the respondent from committing
family offenses against Ms. Diaz because she was not eligible
for such protection under section 812(1).29  In essence, the
court’s decision in In re Miriam M. disturbingly seemed to
brand petitioner’s domestic partner as a person not entitled to
full safety and protection as a resident of the home.30
Presently, because of the alterations to section 812(1), the
paradigm has shifted.  One could argue that New York now
boasts one of the nation’s broadest access schemes for family
court orders of protection.  The Expanded Access to Family
Court Act, by adding a new subsection, codified as section
812(1)(e), specifically amends the statutory definition of “mem-
bers of the same family or household” to include:
[P]ersons who are not related by consanguinity or
affinity and who are or have been in an intimate rela-
tionship regardless of whether such persons have lived
together at any time.  Factors the court may consider
in determining whether a relationship is an “intimate
relationship” include but are not limited to: the nature
or type of relationship, regardless of whether the rela-
tionship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interac-
tion between the persons; and the duration of the
relationship.  Neither a casual acquaintance nor ordi-
nary fraternization between two individuals in busi-
ness or social contexts shall be deemed to constitute an
“intimate relationship.”31
Determining precisely what subsection (e) means remains to be
seen.  Theoretically, the wording is open-ended enough to per-
29. Id. See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 827(a)(vii) (McKinney 1998) (“For the
purposes of this section aggravating circumstances shall mean physical injury or
serious physical injury to the petitioner caused by the respondent, the use of a
dangerous instrument against the petitioner by the respondent, a history of re-
peated violations of prior orders of protection by the respondent, prior convictions
for crimes against the petitioner by the respondent or the exposure of any family or
household member to physical injury by the respondent and like incidents, behav-
iors and occurrences which to the court constitute an immediate and ongoing dan-
ger to the petitioner, or any member of the petitioner’s family or household.”).
30. See In re Miriam, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
31. Ch. 326, sec. 7, § 812(1), 2008 N.Y. Laws 326 (codified as amended at N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009)).
7
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mit those who can prove only a modicum of intimacy to obtain
an order of protection from the family court.32
An analysis of the change must then start with an overview
of its most unambiguous elements:
• Lacking a legal relation by blood or marriage or not
having a child in common with the respondent no
longer stand as obstacles to potentially gaining ac-
cess to family court.33
• The subsection covers those who “are or have been”
in a relationship, meaning that a break-up does not
automatically preclude entry into family court.34
• While the subsection demands an “intimate rela-
tionship,” the relationship need not be sexual in
nature.35
• The subsections reveal what the state holds is not
an “intimate relationship”—a “casual acquaintance”
or “ordinary fraternization” in “business or social
contexts” does not count.36
These elements establish parameters, but otherwise, the
amended statute makes no clear offering of its intent.37  The
lack of statutory clarity raises several critical questions and is-
sues.  What is an “intimate relationship,” especially one with no
sexual component?  Do two dates and a quick dissolution of the
relationship constitute intimate relations?  Can pre-teens and
young teenagers ably enter into “intimate relationships” that
would necessitate judicial intervention, and if so, will the court
need to appoint guardians?  Can elderly victims who have been
abused by their full-time caretakers apply for orders?  While the
subsection lists three guiding factors—the nature of a relation-
ship, the frequency of contact between the members of the rela-
32. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(e).
33. See id.
34. Id.  Connecticut, in its own access scheme, qualifies those who are or who
“[have] recently been in a dating relationship.”  CONN. GEN. STAT § 46b-15(a) (2007)
(emphasis added).  The word “recently” subtly distinguishes Connecticut’s law
from that of New York’s. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(e).
35. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(e).  On this point Governor Paterson told the
New York Times, “They do not have to be sexual.  Theoretically, it could be two
people who are dating and haven’t had sex.  They’ve come close, one refuses the
other and then the stalking starts.”  Hakim, supra note 10.
36. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(e).
37. See id.
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/4
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tionship, and the duration of the relationship—how should the
judge measure these factors?  The wording of the new subsec-
tion underscores the notion that the ultimate determination
may be left to the ideological leanings of the person occupying
the bench.38
Many experts believe judicial guidance at the trial and ap-
pellate levels is needed to clarify who is covered by this statu-
tory provision.39  Additionally, the state has begun to study
emerging patterns and is monitoring the increase in the num-
ber of people seeking orders of protection through the family
courts.  Early indications show that the majority of people seek-
ing orders based on their involvement in an “intimate relation-
ship” are those expected to take advantage of the change (teens,
same-sex intimate partners, and women who are or are not liv-
ing with their boyfriends), while a minority are involved in rela-
tionships that cannot be considered “intimate.”40  A substantial
training effort will be needed to educate police, judges, and at-
torneys to handle the interpretive and enforcement challenges
that lie ahead.  In fact, the Expanded Access to Family Court
Act requires the New York State Office for the Prevention of
Domestic Violence (“OPDV”) to “develop curricula and make
available training to” all of the various parties.41
III. Statutory Schemes from Other States
At this early stage, it is impossible to fully predict how the
courts will interpret section 812(1)(e) of the Family Court Act.
Until New York courts precisely define how to interpret the new
38. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(e).  Stephanie Nilva, Esq., member of the
New York Statewide Coalition for Fair Access to Family Court, stated that there
was a concern during negotiations over the wording of section 812(1)(e). See Nilva,
Telephone Interview, supra note 13.  Specifically, the concern was whether the
wording would allow judges to make rulings adverse to the petitioner in significant
numbers to limit the amendment’s intent. Id.  This may help to explain the vague
wording and limited guiding factors that the state legislature eventually adopted.
Id.
39. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Amy Barasch, Esq., Executive Dir. of
the N.Y. State Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence (Oct. 10, 2008) [here-
inafter Barasch, Telephone Interview] (“Frankly, it’s going to be very challenging.
The law has to be defined by the judges.  We’ll start to get a clear definition of
‘intimate relationship’ [only when that happens].”).
40. Id.
41. Ch. 326, § 14, 2008 N.Y. Laws 326.
9
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statute and these definitions become etched into common law,
those courts must look to other jurisdictions for legal guidance.
It is therefore instructive to survey the statutory language and
evolving case law from other states to ascertain how they have
attempted to define an “intimate relationship.”42  Overall, the
individual states differ widely in their approaches.
Some states have set specific limits when defining an “inti-
mate relationship.”  For example, Louisiana, Montana, North
Carolina, and South Carolina expressly limit access to orders of
protection to people in heterosexual relationships.43  In fact,
South Carolina expressly lists “a male and female who are co-
habiting or formerly have cohabited” as one subcategory under
“household member.”44  In contrast, Hawaii defines “family or
household member” as “spouses or reciprocal beneficiaries . . .
persons jointly residing or formerly residing in the same dwell-
ing unit, and persons who have or have had a dating
relationship.”45
States also appear to struggle with how to define intimacy.
For example, Delaware and Massachusetts maintain that peti-
tioners must prove a “substantive dating relationship,” which
seems slightly less vague than a “dating relationship” designa-
tion.46  Maine includes “individuals currently or formerly in-
volved in dating each other, whether or not the individuals are
or were sexual partners,”47 while several other states categorize
dating relationships and sexual relationships separately.48  Ad-
ditionally, some states put time restrictions or de facto statutes
of limitations on “intimate relationships.”  For example, Rhode
42. Many states use the related term “dating relationship” rather than “inti-
mate relationship.” See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(2) (1999); MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ch. 209A, § 1 (2008).  The states differ as to whether the relationship must
involve sexual contact or not. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4005(1)
(1998).
43. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(4) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102(2)
(2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(b) (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20(b) (1976).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20(b)(iv) (emphasis added).
45. HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(2); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 1.  Specif-
ically, the Massachusetts statute states that petitioners must prove a “substantive
dating or engagement relationship.” Id.
47. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002(3-A).
48. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (2006); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211
(West 2004); IND. CODE. § 34-26-5-3(a)(2)(c) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101(2)
(2002).
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/4
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Island specifies that couples must have dated within the past
six months or lived together within three years.49  Maryland
goes further than Rhode Island in setting limits by requiring
cohabitants to establish that they engaged in a sexual relation-
ship and lived together with the respondent for “at least 90
days” within one year of the date that she or he files for the
order of protection.50
Moreover, a number of states are very inclusive in defining
who should count as a household member.  For example, many
states include stepparents and stepchildren, as well as foster
family members, in their characterization of a household mem-
ber.51  Several states, including California, Colorado, and Geor-
gia, also include roommates or housemates in such definitions.52
Additionally, Illinois allows “high-risk” adults who need sub-
stantial personal assistance from caregivers to obtain orders of
protection.53  Finally, West Virginia extends protection to a per-
son who “reports or witnesses the domestic violence and has
been abused, threatened or harassed as a result.”54
IV. Texas, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania—New York’s
Spiritual Cousins?
Ultimately, statutes in three states appear to be excellent
prisms through which to contemplate the scope of New York’s
scheme—Texas, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.55  In fact,
except for a few minor differences, the language of the Texas
statute is virtually identical to New York’s.56  Texas’s statutory
definition includes the same three factors for judges to consider
in making determinations of eligibility: nature, frequency, and
49. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-5(b) (1997).
50. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(d) (West 2006).
51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(12) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-
1 (2004); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(6) (1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.720(2),
(3) (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(d).
52. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2) (2005); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-13-1.
53. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(6).
54. See W. VA. CODE § 48-27-305(3) (2004).
55. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 1 (2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102
(2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b) (Vernon 2005).
56. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b), with N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 812(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009).
11
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duration.57  Massachusetts’s law is similar but differs in three
respects: (1) “dating relationship” is categorized as “substantive
dating relationship,”58 (2) the phrasing “are or were” is used to
acknowledge consanguinity, affinity, marriage, and shared resi-
dence in both past and present times,59 and (3) “the length of
time elapsed since the termination of the relationship” is also a
determining factor.60  These differences appear to embrace a
more restrictive access scheme than that applied in New York.61
Pennsylvania’s definition of “family or household members”
reads more simply: “[s]pouses or persons who have been
spouses, persons living as spouses or who lived as spouses, par-
ents and children, other persons related by consanguinity or af-
finity, current or former sexual or intimate partners or persons
who share biological parenthood.”62  Certainly the phrase “cur-
rent or former sexual or intimate partners” appears to be quite
inclusive,63 especially in comparison to the New York, Texas,
and Massachusetts statutes.64
If the statutory language from these other states is analo-
gous to New York’s scheme, then case law from these jurisdic-
tions may portend what lies ahead.  One 2003 Texas case, B.C.
v. Rhodes,65 may serve as an example.  In Rhodes, a minor male
student at the Texas School for the Deaf sexually assaulted a
minor female student in a school bathroom.66  The male stu-
dent, according to the Texas Court of Appeals, had been dating
57. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b) (“For purposes of this title, “dating rela-
tionship” means a relationship between individuals who have or have had a contin-
uing relationship of a romantic or intimate nature.  The existence of such a
relationship shall be determined based on consideration of: (1) the length of the
relationship; (2) the nature of the relationship; and (3) the frequency and type of
interaction between the persons involved in the relationship.”).  In addition, the
Texas statute states that “[a] casual acquaintanceship or ordinary fraternization
in a business or social context does not constitute a ‘dating relationship’ under
Subsection (b).” Id. § 71.0021(c).
58. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(e).
62. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2001).
63. Id.
64. Compare 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102, with MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 1
(2007), N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(e), and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b)
(Vernon 2005).
65. 116 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. App. 2003).
66. Id. at 879-80.
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/4
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the female student for just two weeks prior to the incident and
she expressed to a counselor her fear of him due to his “ ‘ten-
dency . . . to blow up.’”67  Later, she told several friends about
the incident and eventually ended the relationship.68  Although
the school initially attempted to protect her from the male stu-
dent, they were placed on the same bus just a week after the
incident.69  Subsequently, the female student’s father sought
and obtained a family court order of protection on his daugh-
ter’s behalf.70
Although counsel for the male student argued that the
Texas statute allowed only adults to seek protection,71 the
Rhodes court interpreted the statute’s language as clearly al-
lowing an adult to seek protection on behalf of his or her child.72
Additionally, the court deferred to the trial court’s finding that
the relationship between the two students was sufficient to sat-
isfy the requirements for a “dating relationship” under the stat-
ute, despite the young ages of the two students and brief
duration of their relationship.73  Given that the statute inter-
preted in this case is similar to New York’s new law74 and that
the Rhodes court construed the definition of “dating relation-
ship” broadly,75 the Rhodes case may be instructive.
In Massachusetts, commonwealth courts also appear to
have broadly interpreted that state’s statute.  The Massachu-
setts Appeals Court illustrated this approach in Sorgman v.
Sorgman.76  In Sorgman, the court issued a civil order of protec-
tion in favor of the plaintiff, despite the fact that the defendant
was her former stepfather who had divorced the plaintiff’s
mother over twenty years prior to the order and had not since
lived with the plaintiff.77  The court noted that “[t]he defendant
resists this result by suggesting that the statute was not meant
67. Id. at 880.
68. Id. at 880.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 882.
72. Id. at 883.
73. Id. at 884.
74. Compare N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009), with TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021 (Vernon 2007).
75. See Rhodes, 116 S.W.3d at 884.
76. 729 N.E.2d 1141 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
77. Id. at 1142.
13
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to protect ‘ex-stepchildren’ such as the plaintiff, particularly
those whose ‘ex’ status has persisted for so many years.”78  Re-
jecting this argument, the court held that “[n]othing in the stat-
ute or case law supports this.”79  Although chapter 209A, section
one of the Massachusetts General Laws lists four specific fac-
tors to consider in determining whether an individual belongs
within the protected class of family members,80 the Sorgman
court chose to interpret the statute broadly.81
Pennsylvania courts have had to determine the scope of the
phrase “current or former sexual or intimate partners” without
the assistance of any such list from its legislature.82  The result-
ing decisions have interpreted this statutory language just as
broadly as those of Texas and Massachusetts.  For example, in
the 1999 case of D.H. v. B.O.,83 the petitioner and the respon-
dent were former same-sex partners who had only been in-
volved for “one and one-half months.”84  Although the
respondent’s petition was dismissed on other grounds,85 the Su-
perior Court of Pennsylvania held that the nature and short du-
ration of the relationship did not preclude the respondent from
seeking such an order in family court86 and that the “evidence
was sufficient to demonstrate an intimate relationship.”87
V. A Separate Challenge: Greater Number of Petitioners,
Same System Capacity
The case law from Texas, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania
may help forecast how New York Family Court judges will in-
terpret the Expanded Access to Family Court Act.  There is,
however, a concern that expanding access to family court may
result in a substantial increase in persons filing for orders of
protection.  In fact, in July 2008, the Honorable Judith S. Kaye,
the recently retired Chief Judge of New York, publicly ex-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2007).
81. See Sorgman, 729 N.E.2d at 1142.
82. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2001).
83. 734 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
84. Id. at 410.
85. Id. at 412.
86. Id. at 410.
87. Id.
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/4
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pressed concern that the family courts might suffer from a crisis
of capacity by having to handle this expanded caseload.88
New York State currently employs a total of 127 family
court judges.89  Judge Kaye reported that in 2007, family court
judges issued approximately fifty thousand orders of protec-
tion.90  Assuming each family court judge in New York State
had a similar caseload, this would amount to 394 protection or-
ders per judge.91  The legislature, nonetheless, denied a request
to hire an additional thirty-nine judges in 2007.92
To address this crisis of capacity, the Expanded Access to
Family Court Act authorizes judicial hearing officers and court
referees to conduct the initial ex parte hearings in which tempo-
rary orders of protection are granted.93  The Act also requires
OPDV to train these officials.94  Despite this, Judge Kaye ex-
pressed concern that by taking these judicial hearing officers
and court referees away from the judges for stretches to oversee
these hearings, the judges may find themselves compromised in
their ability to fully perform their own duties.95  Hence, the
“very good intention” of the new access scheme may be under-
mined.96  “This legislation is wonderful,”97 Judge Kaye told
WNYC.  “We just need to be sure we have the resources so we
can do the job that we’ve been called upon to do.  That’s what’s
concerning me very, very deeply.”98
VI. A New Beginning
Until the recent passage of New York’s Expanded Access to
Family Court Act, thousands of victims were denied an effective
way to protect themselves from “intimate relationship” vio-
88. Radio Interview by Brian Lehrer, Host, Nat’l Pub. Radio, with Judith S.
Kaye, N.Y. State Chief Judge (July 11, 2008) [hereinafter Kaye, Radio Interview].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. The authors derived this figure by dividing the estimated number of fam-
ily court protection orders by the number of family court judges employed by the
state.
92. Kaye, Radio Interview, supra note 88.
93. Ch. 326, § 14, 2008 N.Y. Laws 326.
94. Id.
95. Kaye, Radio Interview, supra note 88.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
15
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lence.99  Rather than having access to the family court, where
the primary goal is to protect instead of punish, such victims
were left with the intimidating option of seeking protection
through the police and criminal courts—where already alarm-
ing situations were at risk of being intensified.100
While this new law now allows many additional victims of
abuse to obtain relief in family court, it simply remains to be
seen over time how it will be applied and interpreted by the
courts.  It is as if the state legislature has traveled a long and
winding road and opened the door to a new house, but has ne-
glected to furnish it, hang the drapes, or even put up the dry-
wall.  So, it appears that this shell of a house still needs its
certificate of occupancy and more on-the-job contractors to en-
sure a seamless structure.  Now it is incumbent upon the vari-
ous stakeholders to supply the finishing touches to the “house”
for the benefit of all victims of domestic violence seeking safety
and protection in family court.
99. See Stashenko, supra note 2.
100. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)-(d) (McKinney 1998) (current version
at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)-(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009)).
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/4
